Employer Associations and Trade Disputes by Stone, Leon N.
236 LAW JOURNAL -MARCH, 1939
Co., I06 Super. Ct. 259, 161 Ad. 434 (1932). The presumption so
provided for is not rebuttable by proof of later recovery. Heralds of
Liberty v. Jones, 142 Miss. 735, 107 So. 519 (1926); Dietlin v. Mo.
State Life Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App. I5, 14 Pac. (2d) 331 (1932).
Contra: Mitchell v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 205 N.C. 721, 172
S.E. 497 (934); Graham v. Equitable Life Assur. SOC., 221 Iowa
748, 266 N.W. 82o (1936). The usual requirement that total disabil-
ity must exist for sixty days prior to submission of proof of a total- and
permanent disability does not raise a presumption of permanence on the
expiration of that period. Paul v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., supra. Such
a clause is generally construed to provide "days of grace" to allow in-
vestigation by the insurer. Lewis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra;
Ginell v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra; Job v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.,
133 Cal. App., Supp. 791, 22 P (2d) 607 (1933). But cf. Laup-
heimer v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. io18, 24 S.W.(2d) 158 (193).
PAUL W. BROWN
LABOR LAW
EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE DISPUTES
Plaintiff corporation was engaged in the business of selling and
repairing automobiles. At one time it had a contract with the defendant
union, but the contract had not been renewed and had terminated more
than two years before the present dispute. None of plaintiff's employees
belonged to any union and in fact all had voted not to join the defendant
union, stating that they had no differences with the plaintiff. Just before
the vote was taken, defendant had begun picketing plaintiff under a plan
to picket successively one of thirty such auto dealers each year. The facts
stated by the court do not clearly show the exact purpose of the picketing,
but the opinion indicates that the court felt the object was a closed shop.
The Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County held there was no
labor dispute, and therefore issued a temporary injunction restraining
defendant union from all picketing, and from passing out copies of a
paper containing statements tending to create the false impression that
tiouble existed between plaintiff and his employees. White-Allen Chev-
rolet, Inc. v. Auto Mechanics Local Union No. 314 et al., 27 Ohio Abs.
273, 12 Ohio Op. 288, 3 L.R.R. 205 (Nov. 19, 1938).
In another recent decision, plaintiff corporation, a dealer in new and
used cars, was a member of an association originally composed of one
hundred and nine auto dealers known as the Cleveland Automotive
Trade Association, a corporation. Plaintiff, along with the other mem-
bers had delegated to this corporation full authority to bargain for them
with labor unions. The association acting through its Labor Advisory
Committee made an agreement for one year with the defendant union
covering minimum rates of pay, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment. While the agreement was in force, plaintiff had abided by it in
dealing with its employees, even though they were not members of de-
fendant union. At the expiration of the contract, the association, then
consisting of eighty-two members, and the defendant union began nego-
tiations for a new agreement. Failing to come to terms, the defendant
union then called a strike against all members of the association, and
began picketing~the plaintiff, advertising to the public that a trade dispute
existed between the union and the plaintiff. At this time no difference
of opinion existing between plaintiff and its own employees. The Com-
mon Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County held that a valid labor dispute
existed, and refused to enjoin picketing so far as it was peaceful. Frankel
Chevrolet Co., et al. v. Meerchaum, et al., 27 Ohio Abs. 42.5, 12 Ohio
Op. 387, 3 L.R.R. 347 (Oct. 5, 1938).
The White-Allen case, supra, is in line with the majority of Ohio
cases in defining the words "labor dispute," as meaning a dispute between
an employer and his own employees, and relating to wages, hours or
working conditions. Park v. Hotel, et al. Employees, 22 O.N.P. (N.S.)
257, 30 Ohio Dec. 64 (1919); Brown & Son v. United Mine Work-
ers, 25 O.N.P. (N.S.) 485 (1925); United Tailors Co. v. Joint Board
of Amalgamated Workers of America, et al., 26 O.N.P. (N.S.) 439
(1926); Saltzman v. Employees Local, 25 Ohio Abs. 354, io Ohio
Op. 6 (1937); Labor Law-Definition of Labor Disputes by W. K.
Stanley, io Ohio Bar.703 (Mar. 21, 1938). The court distinguished
Clark Lunch Co. v. The Cleveland Waiters Local No. xo6, 22 O.A.
265, 4 Ohio Abs. 669 (1926); on two grounds, pointing out in the
first place that in that case the union men handed out cards to patrons
and others during the luncheon and dinner hours. These cards asked
the public not to patronize the Clark Co. stating truthfully that it did not
employ union labor. The court compared these cards with the copies of
the newspapers known as the "Labor Union," which was likewise
handed out by the picketers in the White-Allen case. The court felt that
the papers contained statements tending to create a false impression of
trouble between the plaintiff and his empl6yees. The second basis for
distinction was that in the Clark case, supra, the union had organized
other restaurants which paid higher wages, and required shorter hours
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of labor. The court in that case felt the union was justified in influenc-
ing its members and friends in order to protect itself and the competitors
who employed union labor. But in the White-All.en case, none of the
other dealers was organized, and the plaintiff was the only dealer being
picketed. The court therefore felt that to permit the picketing to con-
tinue would result in the destruction of the one company's business, and
its diversion to the twenty-nine others similarly situated, without the
union's object being attained. The court held further that despite the
rule of the Clark case, the rule is firmly established in Ohio that picket-
ing is not proper in those cases in which there is no trade dispute between
the employer and his employees.
It is interesting to note that the court in the other principal case,
the Frankel case, supra, was the same as decided the Saltzman case,
supra, where the strict definition of a labor dispute was followed, a case
cited by the court in the White-Allen case. Thus in the two principal
cases, the courts accept the definition of a labor dispute as stated in the
Park case, supra. However the Frankel case on its facts is the first of
its kind in Ohio in that the employers had there acted in concert with
other employers, and operating through a joint association had contracted
in reference to hours, wages, and terms and conditions of employment
affecting employees of all members of the contracting group. In the
light of these circumstances the court held the accepted definition inap-
plicable.
In reaching its conclusion the court in the Frankel case stresses two
factors. The first is the delegation to a trade association of the right to
bargain with labor unions on plaintiff's account. In the area of admin-
istrative labor law, the National Labor Relations Board has given similar
treatment to analogous fact situations. It has held that an association of
employers is to be treated as a single employer within the National Labor
Relations Act where the association has engaged in collective bargaining
for all its individual employer members. The theory is that the Act
includes "any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly" within the term "employer." "Person" is defined as "one
or more . . . associations . . 2' In Re Mobile Steamship Assn., et al.,
3 L.R.R. x66 (Sept. 29, 1938) In Re Admiar Rubber Co., 3 LR.R.
262 (Oct. 19, 1938); In Re Shitowner's Ass'n of the Pacific Coast,
et al., 2 L.R.R. 547 (June 21, 1938). The second factor is that the
employer had acted in concert with others in setting up an economic unit
to establish wages, hours, etc., which would affect and be applicable to all
employees of the industry, including members of the local unions. On
the termination of the contract, the parties bargained for two and one-
half months but failed to reach a new agreement. The court then felt
that the entire course of conduct, the prior dealings between the parties
resulting in the establishment of jural and legal relationships, plus the
renewed bargaining and failure to agree, gave rise to a labor dispute,
and therefore the defendant union had a right to picket peacefully for
the purpose of truthfully advertising their dispute to the public. For the
purpose of determining the bargaining unit under section 9 of the N.L.
R.A. (29 U.S.C.), the Board has held that employers who have dele-
gated to an association the right to bargain for them, have set it up as
their economic unit dealing with labor by and through the association
and being bound by the contracts it made; In Re Mobile Steamship
liss'n., et al., supra;- In Re Admiar Rubber Co., supra; In Re Ship-
owner's A4ss'n. of the Pacific Coast, et al., supra; and that the employees
of such employers could also be treated as a single bargaining unit, on the
theory that such a unit would be most appropriate, due to: first, uni-
formity of working conditions; second, treatment by the employees
themselves in that manner; and third, parallel development by th6 em-
ployers. In Re Shipownerss Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, et al., supra.
Applying the rationale of the Frankel case to the White-Allen case
it is possible to suggest two plausible arguments for refusing an injunction
in that case. There was no agency in the White-Allen case, therefore
there is no analogy on that point. However it would seem immaterial
whether the employer acted through an agent or in person in dealing
with the union and accepting the contract previously made. As to the
secon dargument, the facts are different but the theory of the Frankel
case and the N.L.R.B. cases cited, may be said to be applicable. It might
be suggested in the W, hite-Allen case that an economic unit was set up
for bargaining, which was recognized and accepted by all the parties
involved. Plaintiff had previously dealt with the union representing the
craft as an appropriate bargaining unit, and once having accepted them
he cannot later disclaim them. Moreover can it be denied that there was
a labor dispute between plaintiff and defendant in the White-llen case?
Did not the parties previously bargain and enter into a legal and jural
relationship? When the first contract was terminated they bargained
again, but terms weren't acceptable, and therefore no agreement re-
sulted. Their differences, however, might be brought within the reason-
ing of the Frankel case which states, " . . . One may not freely join
in such a course of conduct resulting in contractual relations and accept
all the benefits without being willing to sustain some of the natural
burdens logically resulting from such a relationship."
These contentions rest, however, on the assumption of a persistency
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of an earlier relation. In the Frankel case this was an established fact,
but in the White-All/en case the lapse of over two years would seem to
interrupt this former relation so seriously as to preclude the application
of the arguments of the Frankel case. The White-Alllen case merely
reaffirms the general definition of a trade dispute in Ohio, while the
Frankel case has extended that definition to include disputes with non-
employees where there has been an immediately prior course of dealing
sufficient to imply an acceptance by the employer of this group as a lar-
gaining unit.
LEON N. STONE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
CHATTEL LOAN ACT - HOLDER IN DUE, COURSE
A provision in General Code section 6346-5a, known as The Chat-
tel Loans Act, reads: "If interest, consideration, or charges in excess of
those permitted by this act shall be charged, contracted for, or received,
the contract and all papers in connection therewith shall be void and the
licensee shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest,
or charges Whatsoever." The case of Capitol Loan and Savings Co. v.
Biry, et ald, 134 Ohio St. 333, i6 N.E. (2d) 450, (1938), held
absolutely void a note and mortgage given by a borrower to a company
licensed under this Act. The loan was for less than $300.00 where
the chattel mortgage was on household goods, and, in addition to the
provisions for foreclosure proceedings authorized under the Act, the
mortgage contained a provision concerning default, and in that event,
provided for entry by the mortgagee " . . . into any building or upon
any premises where said property, or any part thereof, may be situated,
and take the same into its possession without process of law and dispose
of the same at any time thereafter, at public or private sale, and out of
the proceeds of said sale to pay first, the reasonable cost and expense of
taking, keeping, and selling the same and all court costs . . ." The
grounds relied upon by the court were that the note and mortgage were
to be considered as a part of the same transaction; Mc~lelland v. Sorter,
39 Ohio St. 12 (1883), that the excessive charges as defined by Gen-
eral Code section 6346-5, were "contracted for"; the statute providing
"the contract and all other papers in connection therewith shall be void
and the licensee (italics supplied) shall have no right to collect . . ."
The case was not affected by the fact that General Code section 8566,
provides only for an actual foreclosure proceeding in the case of a chattel
